Shareholder Oppression in Delaware

Delaware does not have a cause of action for oppression per se, but it does offer relief for minority shareholder oppression-like claims applying other legal principles.  Thus, oppression-like claims must be carefully pleaded in Delaware.  

Since court’s in other states are likely to apply Delaware law to oppression-like claims to companies organized in Delaware, vigilance must also be exercised in pleading claims relating to Delaware corporations in non-Delaware courts.  Some courts outside of Delaware, such as the Southern District of New York and the Northern District of Illinois, have upheld causes of action for shareholder oppression under Delaware law, while others, such as the District of New Jersey, have dismissed oppression claims for failure to state a claim under Delaware law.

Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), is a Delaware case that often cited for the proposition that Delaware does have a shareholder oppression remedy, and also for the proposition that it does not.  The case states that “[t]he entire fairness test, correctly applied and articulated, is the proper judicial approach” to deciding claims brought by minority shareholders against those in control of the corporation.  Thus, some conclude that oppression claims may be pursued under the entire fairness doctrine.   

However, Nixon v. Blackwell also, contains language that seems to indicate otherwise:  

Shareholder Oppression in New York

Applicable Statute

New York State’s corporate dissolution statute, NY Business Corporations 1104-a, provides for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation when the “directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders” in a company that is not publicly traded.

New York courts have held that oppressive conduct is distinct from illegal or fraudulent conduct, and thus also a reason for corporate dissolution. 

What is Oppressive Conduct?

In an “oppression” case, the first inquiry of a New York court will be to determine whether the complained of acts are actually “oppressive.”  Though the dissolution statute does not define what oppressive acts are, one of the leading cases on the subject, Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., interprets them as actions which “substantially defeat shareholder expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner’s decisions to join the venture.”  This standard is widely followed.

Oppressive conduct is most often found when there are a number of actions that, when taken together, have the effect of denying the minority shareholder benefits from the company that he or she had the reasonable expectation of.  Often the Court will look at what is motivating the majority’s actions and whether there is an effort to “freeze out” or “squeeze out” the minority. 

What is Shareholder Oppression?

The “shareholder oppression” doctrine is a set of legal principles that protect minority shareholders from abuse by the majority.  As such, these principles stand in direct contradiction to the central rule of corporate decision making that the will of the majority governs.  The doctrine also runs contrary to and can prevail over several other well established legal principles, including the business judgment rule, the employment at will doctrine and derivative claims distinction.  More on these later.

The principles protecting the rights of minority equity owners are articulated and implemented differently from state to state, and their implementation often involves a balancing of the rights of the majority to control the business entity’s destiny and the rights of the minority to receive the often unarticulated benefits they anticipated when they joined the enterprise.  The rules may vary within a state depending on the type of entity, as well. 

Protecting Trade Secrets – Basic Practical Considerations

The protection of trade secrets involves a combination of business and legal acumen.

The best way to protect a trade secret is not to disclose it to anybody.  This should be the default position – keep it secret!  But, in the real world, that is rarely possible or practical.  Often, trade secrets must be disclosed to be able to benefit from them.

Trade secret disclosures can generally be broken down into three categories: (1) Disclosure to employees; (2) Disclosure to potential strategic partners and (3) Disclosure to potential sources of financing.

Protecting Trade Secrets – Starting with the Basics

What is a Trade Secret?

Although the definition may vary somewhat from state to state, a trade secret has three basic characteristics:

  • It is a secret– not generally known by or readily ascertainable to competitors;
  • It confers a competitive advantage on its owner; and
  • It is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
  • Although the three definitional elements of a trade secret are relatively simple concepts, each has been the subject of extensive case law interpretation.  If a dispute erupts over an alleged wrongful taking of a trade secret -- "misappropriation" -- the analysis over whether each of these elements has been met can become exceedingly complex.  Any party seeking to protect a trade secret must keep in mind, from the outset, how it will prove these three elements, if it is forced to do so.